The aim of this paper is twofold: The general aim is to shed light on the structure of species discoveries new to biology by bringing together a practice-oriented philosophy of science perspective with a philosophy of language perspective. The more specific aim is to argue that and to show how the overall structure of biological species discoveries comprises aspects of both institutional and non-institutional reality. The author proceeds as follows: he shows that placing the focus on the topic of scientific (...) discoveries enables us to circumvent two long-standing problems. He analyzes three fictional cases of discoveries in order to bring about a greater sensitivity for the concept of discovery. He takes a closer look at a real example – the discovery of a deep-sea anglerfish – and identifies the main structural features of species discovery processes in biology. In order to connect these results with Searle’s account of institutional reality, he provides an overview of the conceptual apparatus needed here. In bringing Searle’s account together with the structural features of species discoveries developed before, he shows to what extent declarative speech acts play a central role in species discovery processes in biology. (shrink)

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that we need a philosophy of scientific discovery. Before turning to the question of what such a philosophy might look like, I address two questions: Don’t we have a philosophy of scientific discovery yet? And do we need one at all? To answer the first question, I take a closer look at history and find that we have not had a systematic philosophy of scientific discovery worthy of the name for over 150 years. To answer (...) the second question, I put forward three arguments that show the importance of a philosophy of scientific discovery. Briefly, I arrive at the following answers: No, we don’t yet have a philosophy of scientific discovery, and yes, we definitely need one. To remedy this shortcoming, I analyze the concept of discovery, leading me to the insight that scientific discoveries have an underlying structure with certain structural features. Some of these features may be important but not indispensable to scientific discovery processes; these include eureka moments, serendipities, joint discoveries, special science funding, and others. In addition, I identify three indispensable structural features which I examine in detail and which I place in a picture with a certain dynamics according to which the process of making scientific discoveries can be seen as a path, leading us from finding and acceptance to knowledge. (shrink)

Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries. -/- Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific (...) discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do discoveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science? -/- In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries? (shrink)

The investigation of the mind has been a central undertaking in philosophy for centuries. It is characterized, among other things, by the following questions: What are the characteristics of the mind? What types of mental states can be distinguished? Is a scientific or physical explanation of the mind possible? Can the mental be reduced to the physical? Is the realm of the physical causally closed? What does it mean for something to be physical? How can the mind bring about actions? (...) Are we free to act as we will? Is our will free? What role do neuroscientific findings play in the development of a convincing theory of mind? And what role do philosophical thought experiments play? What exactly characterizes a good theory of mind? This volume, which is also aimed at beginners, brings together contributions to the investigation of the mind by Andreas Hüttemann, Holger Lyre, Jan G. Michel, Gernot Münster, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Achim Stephan, and Henrik Walter. (shrink)

John Searle zählt zweifellos zu den weltweit wichtigsten und einflussreichsten Denkern der Gegenwart. Seine grundlegenden und nachhaltigen Beiträge zur Sprachphilosophie, zur Philosophie des Geistes, zur Handlungstheorie und zur Sozialphilosophie werden weit über die Grenzen des Fachs Philosophie hinaus wahrgenommen und gehören vielfach zum Standardrepertoire wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Lehre. -/- Michael Kober und Jan G. Michel bieten in diesem Buch eine übersichtliche sowie gut verständliche, aber auch kritische Einführung in das Gesamtwerk John Searles: Neben einer sehr persönlichen biographischen Notiz und einem (...) kurzen Überblick über seine Leitfragen und Positionen wird jeder der genannten Arbeitsbereiche John Searles in seinen wesentlichen Grundzügen historisch wie systematisch eingeordnet, dargestellt und diskutiert. Indem Kober und Michel dabei nicht chronologisch, sondern inhaltlich systematisch vorgehen, treten außerdem die Zusammenhänge innerhalb des Gesamtwerks John Searles deutlich hervor, so dass dieses schließlich im Lichte der heutigen Philosophie bewertet werden kann. (shrink)

Dealing with conflicts seems to be a great challenge in society today. But not only in society. Higher education displays an air of resoluteness with certainty and security that disguises the conflicts and the fear of conflicts in a substantial number of subjects. If not in a state of denial, higher education avoids taking up conflicts over issues, for learning. The detailed investigation of Tagore’s pedagogical writings, with a focus on the importance of conflicts in education, reveals a genuine embrace (...) of conflicts for education. Conflicts are natural and necessary for the development and change of both the individual and society and the start of a ‘creative imagination’ to solve the problems we face in life. Contradictions in conflicts are not incompatible incongruities that are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, but to the contrary, in need of each other. Contradictions do not represent different worlds but are substantial parts of one world: together they form a unity. Conflicting forces are necessary to create harmony. Creativity, imagination, love, art, and critical encounters are key elements in Tagore’s practical education aimed at finding similarities among people instead of emphasizing differences. Relations between people over the Identity of people. In other words, we need conflicts to become creative and imaginative human beings. The paper continues discussing conceptual and practical issues that seem necessary to get the teaching of conflicts in education off the ground. On the conceptual level, in particular our dealing with uncertainty and fear, the valuation of conflict and the need for uncertainty-researching education. On a practical level, I propose a certain teaching model, a supportive curriculum, a way of choosing genuine conflicts for education and finally, I argue for specific support and education of teachers, acknowledging the vital role teachers play in delivering the education that we need. (shrink)

In this paper, I first explain the core thesis of transhumanism, which I understand as the position that humans can expand their current physical and mental limits with the help of technologies provided by science. I then turn to the so-called extended mind thesis discussed in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that, contrary to first impressions, the central concept in these debates is not that of the mind, but the concept of cognition, which, in my view, (...) can be extended by external technological aids without serious ethical implications for a person. This leads me to finally consider the concept of an extended person, which is often seen as a cornerstone of transhumanism. (shrink)

The Right of Nonuse provides a fresh and remarkably different perspective on the real causes of the ills plaguing the world's resources and environment. It re-examines the very nature of nature, and from this new perspective, argues that what is needed is for humans to grant to natural resources a legal right to be left alone - a right of nonuse. In the process, it explores the following questions: Why do natural resources continue to be depleted and removed at an (...) alarming rate? Why are species becoming extinct at a pace that may be unprecedented? Why does the environment continue to be polluted? Why do the weather and climate seem to be changing? Perhaps most important, why have laws, legal institutions and governments been unable to address and correct these problems? Jan Laitos reviews the history of our relationship with the natural environment and develops new ways of thinking about nature and its protection. Instead of proceeding with human-based goals, Laitos argues that we should protect environmental resources for their own intrinsic value. Instead of giving humans more and more rights to clean up the environment, and to halt resources depletion, a right of nonuse held by the resource itself should be created. Natural resources have always possessed this parallel nonuse function, and society should recognize and legitimize it. (shrink)

Building on William G. Lycan’s insight that proper names are paronymous, I pursue two goals in this paper: I argue that Lycan’s insight is not restricted to proper names, but can be extended to include certain general terms, and I aim to demonstrate how this contributes to a better understanding of sentences in the context of scientific discovery. To this end, I first address the question of how to best grasp the largely unknown concept of paronymy by tracing it back (...) to Aristotle, and by exploring recent developments in the philosophy of language and in linguistics. I then focus in greater detail on Lycan’s argument that proper names are paronymous and extend this reasoning to general terms, using analogous examples to show that general terms, like proper names, exhibit paronymy. Shifting the focus to scientific discovery, I show how recognizing the paronymy of general terms enhances our understanding of how scientific terms evolve over time and relate to other terms. My analysis also reveals that the “is” in scientific sentences does not necessarily function as the “is” of identity but can, among others, also be interpreted as the “is” of explication. This allows not only for the resolution of various puzzles, but also for different readings of sentences to coexist peacefully. (shrink)

In this entry, I provide an overview of reductionism, a family of philosophical positions unified by the idea that one entity—whether an object, property, theory, or conceptual scheme—can be subsumed under another. I first examine reductionism in the philosophy of science, distinguishing between three major approaches: reduction as translation, as proposed by logical empiricists; reduction as derivation, exemplified by Nagel’s model of theory reduction; and reduction as explanation, as found in eliminative accounts such as those of Kemeny and Oppenheim. I (...) then turn to the role of reductionism in the philosophy of mind, where the identity theory claims that mental states are identical to neurophysiological states. This view, however, faces challenges from the multiple realization argument (Putnam), which suggests that mental properties cannot be straightforwardly reduced to physical properties and instead supports functionalist alternatives. While reductionist frameworks have played a crucial role in shaping scientific and philosophical inquiry, persistent challenges—including issues of theoretical pluralism and the explanatory gap—ensure that debates about the scope and limits of reductionism remain ongoing. (shrink)

In this paper, I mainly pursue the following two goals: on the one hand, I want to show how a central Fregean insight is tried to be captured within a two-dimensional strategy. On the other hand, I want to show that, in the light of Saul Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism, this strategy is faced with a fundamental problem. I proceed in four steps: in a first step, I bring together the passages that contain a central Fregean insight as a source (...) of inspiration for a two-dimensional reconstruction and that suggest a descriptivist reading of Frege’s view. In a second step, I shortly present Kripke’s threefold argumentation against two versions of descriptivism, which is also the basis for Kripke’s view that proper names are rigid designators. In a third step, I explain the basic idea of a Frege-inspired two-dimensional strategy which is used to reconcile theories of definite descriptions with theories of rigid designation and which is sometimes characterized as ‘neo-descriptivism’. Since the two-dimensional strategy is dependent on rigidified definite descriptions, I argue, in a fourth step, that, in the light of Kripke’s epistemological and semantic arguments, the two-dimensional strategy is problematic and untenable – though it is, nevertheless, motivated by Kripke’s modal argument. (shrink)

We discuss anatomical data that may represent the substrate for very diverse input to a single folium, indirectly supporting the notion of a laterolateral beam spreading along the long axis of a folium. We also raise the question of whether the more linear body representation in somatosensory cortico-ponto-cerebellar pathways represent an adaptation to sequential processing of information from contiguous body parts.

In this entry, I provide an overview of determinism, the philosophical thesis that the state of a system at one time, together with the laws of nature, completely determines its state at any other time—most notably in the future. I begin by tracing the historical development of determinism from its origins in ancient Greek atomism to its resurgence in early modern science, particularly through figures like Galileo, Newton, and Laplace. I then outline key distinctions within determinism, differentiating it from fatalism (...) and highlighting various interpretations, such as causal, logical, and physical determinism. Finally, I discuss one of the most prominent debates concerning determinism: its relationship to free will. While some thinkers—such as Laplace and Holbach—have viewed determinism as incompatible with human freedom, others—such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant—have sought ways to reconcile the two. The entry concludes by considering contemporary perspectives on determinism, including Karl Popper’s critique and the impact of quantum mechanics on traditional deterministic views. -/- . (shrink)

This habilitation thesis explores the foundations of scientific discovery by examining the roles of language, conceptual structures, and artificial intelligence in knowledge production. It contributes to the emerging field of the philosophy of scientific discovery by addressing fundamental questions: What constitutes a scientific discovery? What structural features characterize discovery processes? How do language and naming practices shape scientific progress? And to what extent can machines participate in or even independently generate discoveries? Drawing from case studies in biology, epistemology, and AI (...) research, this work argues that scientific discovery is a structured process encompassing three core elements: finding, acceptance, and knowledge. Special attention is given to declarative speech acts in the validation of discoveries, the role of ambiguity and naming in the evolution of scientific terminology, and the potential for artificial agents to engage in meaning-making and scientific inference. By integrating perspectives from the philosophy of science, language, and mind, this work lays the groundwork for a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding scientific discovery. (shrink)

This habilitation thesis explores the foundations of scientific discovery by examining the roles of language, conceptual structures, and artificial intelligence in knowledge production. It contributes to the emerging field of the philosophy of scientific discovery by addressing fundamental questions: What constitutes a scientific discovery? What structural features characterize discovery processes? How do language and naming practices shape scientific progress? And to what extent can machines participate in or even independently generate discoveries? Drawing from case studies in biology, epistemology, and AI (...) research, this work argues that scientific discovery is a structured process encompassing three core elements: finding, acceptance, and knowledge. Special attention is given to declarative speech acts in the validation of discoveries, the role of ambiguity and naming in the evolution of scientific terminology, and the potential for artificial agents to engage in meaning-making and scientific inference. By integrating perspectives from the philosophy of science, language, and mind, this work lays the groundwork for a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding scientific discovery. (shrink)

Zu den großen Rätseln der Philosophie des Geistes, ja der Philosophie überhaupt, gehört die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich der qualitative oder phänomenale Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse beschreiben, erklären oder verstehen? Wie lässt sich beispielsweise erklären, wie es ist, eine Rose zu riechen? Einerseits erscheint angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichte der modernen Naturwissenschaften die Annahme plausibel, dass sich letztlich alles physikalisch erklären lässt, auch bewusste Erlebnisse. Bei dieser Annahme handelt es sich um die physikalistische Intuition, die in der analytischen Philosophie des Geistes die (...) Hauptmotivation der gegenwärtig dominierenden Position darstellt: der Position des Physikalismus. Andererseits stellt der nur subjektiv erfassbare qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse das Kernproblem für eine physikalische Erklärung des Bewusstseins dar: Wie sollte das Erlebnis von Rosenduft physikalisch erklärbar sein? Dabei handelt es sich um die antiphysikalistische Intuition, auf deren Grundlage in den letzten Jahren verschiedene Argumente gegen den Physikalismus vorgebracht worden sind. Indem in der vorliegenden Studie diesen beiden, zumindest auf den ersten Blick unvereinbar erscheinenden Intuitionen ausführlich und vorbehaltlos Rechnung getragen wird – sie stellen sowohl den Ausgangspunkt als auch den argumentativen Rahmen der Studie dar –, wird untersucht, wie sich der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse im Rahmen einer Theorie des Bewusstseins fassen lässt. (shrink)

This paper examines the Schlick-Feigl variant of the identity theory of mind and its relevance to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and physicalism. While the standard identity theory, developed in the 1950s and 1960s by U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, and Herbert Feigl, posits that mental states are identical to neural states, different versions of the theory have emerged. I distinguish the Schlick-Feigl variant from the more commonly discussed Place-Smart variant and the eliminativist version associated with Feyerabend and Rorty. The (...) Schlick-Feigl variant, rooted in Moritz Schlick’s epistemology and refined by Herbert Feigl, asserts that mental states and neural processes share the same referent despite differing conceptual frameworks. I argue that this position is closely related to contemporary discussions on Russellian physicalism and the metaphysical interpretation of consciousness. By revisiting the Schlick-Feigl approach, I suggest that it offers a promising framework for addressing key objections to physicalist theories, particularly those concerning the explanatory gap and the nature of phenomenal properties. -/- . (shrink)

Im Jahre 1998 verblüfften Andy Clark und David Chalmers die philosophische Gemeinschaft mit der so genannten These des erweiterten Geistes, die im Kern besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Die These wird seitdem nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. In den Beiträgen, die in dem vorliegenden ersten deutschsprachigen Band zur These des erweiterten Geistes versammelt sind, werden u.a. die folgenden (...) Fragen behandelt: Was soll es heißen, dass der Geist nicht (nur) im Kopf ist? In welchem Sinne könnte er erweitert sein, und welche Möglichkeiten der Erweiterung gibt es? Welche Zusammenhänge bestehen zwischen Geist und Kognition sowie zwischen Kopplung und Konstitution? Was genau besagt der von Clark und Chalmers vorgebrachte aktive Externalismus? Welche Bedeutung hat die These des erweiterten Geistes für repräsentationalistische und für funktionalistische Theorien des Geistes sowie für Theorien kollektiver Intentionalität und sozialer Kognition? Welche Anwendungen der These könnte es geben? (shrink)

In this article, I explore the connections between imagination, names, and discoveries by engaging with the works of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. While these two thinkers had divergent philosophical perspectives, I argue that their ideas can be fruitfully integrated into the broader framework of the philosophy of scientific discovery. First, I examine Whitehead’s notion of imagination, distinguishing between two types: counterfactual reasoning within a given theoretical framework and imaginative narrative construction that reshapes the framework itself. This distinction, I (...) suggest, helps clarify how imagination contributes to scientific discoveries. Second, I revisit Russell’s theory of names, proposing a reinterpretation in light of contemporary debates. I advocate for a predicativist reading of Russell’s theory, which, I argue, provides a better account of how names function in the process of scientific discovery—particularly in the naming of newly identified species or concepts. By integrating Whitehead’s insights on imagination and Russell’s refined theory of names, I offer a systematic contribution to the philosophy of scientific discovery, highlighting the structural role of both conceptual tools in shaping scientific progress. (shrink)

This chapter examines the identity theory and eliminativism, two materialist positions in the philosophy of mind that address the mind-body problem. While both perspectives share the assumption that mental phenomena are ultimately physical, they diverge significantly in their implications. The identity theory, originally developed by Herbert Feigl, U.T. Place, and J.J.C. Smart, asserts that mental states are identical to neurophysiological processes. However, objections such as the argument from multiple realizability have challenged this view, leading to functionalist alternatives. In contrast, eliminativism—developed (...) by thinkers such as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and the Churchlands—denies the existence of mental states as traditionally conceived, arguing that folk psychology is a flawed theoretical framework that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. This chapter explores the historical development of both positions, their core arguments, and the ongoing debates about their viability. While the identity theory has evolved into more nuanced forms, including physicalist and panpsychist interpretations, eliminativism remains a controversial yet influential challenge to traditional conceptions of the mind. (shrink)

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. -/- This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle’s philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by (...) John R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". -/- "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." – John R. Searle. (shrink)

Scientific progress fundamentally depends on discoveries, yet the philosophy of scientific discovery has received relatively little attention. This volume seeks to address this gap by bringing together interdisciplinary perspectives on the nature, process, and implications of making scientific discoveries. By adopting a broad conception of science—including not only the natural and social sciences but also areas of the humanities—the book explores a set of interrelated questions: What are the preconditions for making discoveries? What constitutes a scientific discovery, and how does (...) it differ from other forms of knowledge acquisition? Are discoveries in physics, biology, linguistics, and environmental studies fundamentally similar, or do they follow discipline-specific patterns? How do naming conventions and conceptual frameworks shape discoveries, and what role do errors and serendipities play in scientific progress? Furthermore, the volume reflects on the societal significance of scientific discoveries, questioning their purposes and epistemic boundaries. By engaging with these fundamental issues, the book aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the structures, dynamics, and epistemic impact of scientific discoveries across disciplines. (shrink)

This entry provides an overview of materialism, a philosophical position asserting that everything that exists is fundamentally material or, in its modern form, physical. I begin by exploring the historical roots of materialism, from its early formulations in ancient Greek atomism (Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus) to its revival in early modern thought (Gassendi, Hobbes) and its further development in 18th- and 19th-century scientific materialism. The entry then examines the transition from classical materialism to contemporary physicalism, which emerged with logical empiricism (...) and the Vienna Circle’s emphasis on the language of physics. I outline key variants of materialism, including reductive and non-reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and supervenience-based physicalism. Finally, I discuss major arguments for and against materialism, particularly the causal argument for physicalism and Jackson’s knowledge argument, which challenges materialism’s ability to fully account for subjective experience. (shrink)

In this contribution, I deal firstly with the problem of whether ‘religion’ can actually be defined. My answer is twofold. Firstly, that such a definition must indeed be deemed to be extremely un-like¬ly, if not downright impossible. Secondly, however, that definition also has more modest uses which may turn definitions of religion, that have shed this universalist ambition, into quite useful tools in the academic study of religions. In the second section, I shall address the question of why, if a (...) definition of religion turned out to be merely a useful research tool, one should bother to define ‘religion’ at all. My answer will be that one may indeed well dispense with it, but that, despite its very modest usefulness, it would still be unwise to do so. In my third section, I shall discuss these modest uses of definitions of religion, as well as their strategic implications. In the fourth and last section, I shall discuss the operational, or instrumental, definition of ‘religion’ which I have developed for my particular line of studies as an illustration of the pur¬poses which a definition of religion may serve in the academic study of religions. (shrink)

This volume brings together selected works by the philosopher Rosemarie Rheinwald (1948–2009). The title "Logic, Causation, Freedom" indicates the broad range of topics, which extends from the Achilles paradox to the problem of free will. Rheinwald preferred to address difficult and fundamental problems: logical and semantic paradoxes, the riddles of inductive reasoning, and the nature of causation. Over the years, her early research interests in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and the philosophy of science were joined by interests in the (...) philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Each essay in this collection is preceded by an introductory note by a philosopher who knew Rheinwald and is familiar with her work. The introductory notes contain information about the context of the discussion and critical objections, as well as personal memories and comments. An annotated bibliography at the end of the volume provides information about all of Rosemarie Rheinwald's publications, including those that were not included in this collection. May this volume keep alive the memory of a lovely person and encourage further engagement with her impressive work. (shrink)

This essay addresses the question whether artificial speakers can perform speech acts in the technical sense of that term common in the philosophy of language. We here argue that under certain conditions artificial speakers can perform speech acts so understood. After explaining some of the issues at stake in these questions, we elucidate a relatively uncontroversial way in which machines can communicate, namely through what we call verbal signaling. But verbal signaling is not sufficient for the performance of a speech (...) act. To explain the difference, we elucidate the notion of a speech act developed by Austin in the mid-twentieth century and then discuss Strawson’s influential proposal for how that notion may be related to Grice’s conception of speaker meaning. We then refine Strawson’s synthesis in light of Armstrong’s reconceptualization of speaker meaning in terms of objectives rather than intentions. We next extend this conception of speech acts to the cases of recorded, proxy, and conditional speech acts. On this basis, we propose that a characteristic role for artificial speakers is as proxies in the performance of speech acts on behalf of their human creators. We also consider two objections to our position, and compare our approach with others: while other authors appeal to notions such as “quasi-assertion,” we offer a sharp characterization of what artificial speakers can do that does not impute intentions or similarly controversial powers to them. We conclude by raising doubts that our strategy can be applied to speech acts generally. (shrink)

In this critical discussion, I examine Jimena Canales' "Bedeviled: A Shadow History of Demons in Science," which explores the historical and philosophical roles of imaginary demons in scientific thought. The book traces how conceptual figures such as Laplace’s demon—symbolizing determinism—and Maxwell’s demon—challenging the second law of thermodynamics—have shaped scientific discourse by questioning established principles and prompting paradigm shifts. While Canales primarily situates these demons within the broader history of science, I argue that her work also offers valuable insights for the (...) philosophy of scientific discovery. By illustrating how conceptual constraints, paradoxes, and thought experiments influence the emergence of new theories, she provides a deeper understanding of the conditions under which scientific breakthroughs occur. This perspective aligns with recent discussions on the epistemic and heuristic dimensions of discovery, making a compelling case for the enduring role of imaginary constructs in scientific progress. (shrink)

This introduction provides an overview of William Lycan’s contributions to philosophy, with a particular focus on his work in the philosophy of mind, language, and method. Lycan has been a major figure in contemporary philosophy, defending materialist and functionalist views of the mind, while also engaging with issues such as representationalism, perception, and epistemology. His work on language has significantly shaped debates on truth-conditional semantics, reference, and natural-kind terms. Furthermore, Lycan has contributed to metaphilosophy, especially concerning the nature and progress (...) of philosophical inquiry. The volume is structured into three sections—Mind, Meaning, and Method—each of which reflects key themes in Lycan’s thought. The contributions explore topics such as olfactory representation, the epistemic role of intuitions, and the philosophy of conditionals. By examining Lycan’s work from multiple angles, this volume aims to provide a deeper understanding of his influence and the ongoing relevance of his ideas in contemporary debates. (shrink)

This paper, looking over the life and the texts of the greek philosophers and analyzing the Pythagorean harmony, the two stories of Thales, the outstanding personality of Xenophanes, the humorous sense of Democritus and the Socratic irony, shows that philosophy in the beginning was understood not like an abstract reflection, but like a joyful search of the excellence in the human life.

Die Debatten zu den Themen Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit und Künstliche Intelligenz stehen seit einigen Jahren im Mittelpunkt der Philosophie des Geistes. In den Debatten um den Physikalismus geht es dabei u.a. um folgende Fragen: Lässt sich alles, was es gibt, physikalisch erklären - auch der menschliche Geist? Lässt sich alles auf das Physische reduzieren? Ist der Bereich des Physischen kausal geschlossen? Realisiert das Physische das Mentale? Wie lässt sich mentale Verursachung erklären? In den Debatten um Willensfreiheit fragt man sich: Sind wir (...) physikalisch determiniert? Können wir freie Entscheidungen treffen? Sind wir für unsere Handlungen verantwortlich? Wie verhalten sich Freiheit und Determinismus zueinander? Welchen Beitrag kann die empirische Forschung leisten? In den Debatten um Künstliche Intelligenz werden diese Fragen verhandelt: Können Maschinen denken? Unterscheiden sich Menschen von Maschinen? Sind uns Computer geistig überlegen? Stellt maschinelle Intelligenz ein Modell für menschliche Kognition dar? Welchen wissenschaftlichen Nutzen kann Künstliche Intelligenz haben? Zu jedem der drei Themen Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit und Künstliche Intelligenz bietet das Buch drei Originalbeiträge von renommierten Wissenschaftlern verschiedener Disziplinen sowie jeweils einen kritischen Kommentar. Auf diese Weise soll deutlich werden, dass die drei Themen nicht nur eng miteinander zusammenhängen, sondern auch interdisziplinär von großem Interesse sind. (shrink)

Destroy this temple’: Ethical dimensions in John 2:13–22? The question asked is to what extent could one speak of ethical dynamics in the Gospel of John, even in cases where there is no surface level textual evidence for the presence of ethical material? It is argued that through the process of rereading, which is invited by the Johannine text as performative text, ethical dimensions are highlighted in texts where such emphases were not apparent at the first reading. As example the (...) events at the temple, narrated in John 2:13–22, are analysed. (shrink)